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The “problem of economic development”, as Lucas (1988) states it, is the problem of
accounting for the observed diversity in levels and rates of growth of per capita income
across countries and across time. We study conditions under which capital mobility and
labor mobility (two seemingly income-equalizing forces) may interact with cross-country
differences in income tax rates and income tax principles (two seemingly income-diverging
forces) to generate such diversity. As a corollary, we also examine when countries with
different initial endowments may finally converge in their income levels.
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I. Introduction
Spurred by Lucas’ (1988) seminal paper “On the Mechanics of Economic
Development,” recent years have witnessed renewed and growing interests in
the economics profession in the theory and evidence of economic growth.
Factors that were considered as important sources of growth in the late 1950s
and 1960s, such as technical change and population growth, continue to play
an important role.  But instead of being treated as exogenous factors, they are
now modelled as outcomes from the optimizing decisions of the economicJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 132
1 However, there has never been a neglect of the role of human capital in output growth.
Growth accountants, like Denison (1974), have attributed a large fraction of economic growth
in the US to improvement in the quality of labor services; while Uzawa (1965) and Razin
(1972) have studied the accumulation of human capital in the Ramsey-type growth models.
agents.  [See, e.g., Romer (1990), and Becker et al. (1990).]  On the other hand,
more formal models are developed to incorporate other growth engines like
human capital accumulation, product development, and trade that were
emphasized in the descriptive literature of economic development.  [See, e.g.,
Lucas (1988), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Stokey (1991).]  These
models have been collectively called ‘endogenous growth models’, i.e., models
that are capable of generating persistent growth without relying on exogenous
forces.
Among the various driving forces for growth, human capital formation has
received the most attention.  This is in marked contrast to the significant role
played by the accumulation of physical capital in the traditional Solow-Swan
and Cass-Koopmans-type neoclassical growth models.1  This shift in focus
can be justified on both theoretical and empirical grounds.  While Jones and
Manuelli (1990), among others, have noted that output growth cannot be
sustained through physical capital formation alone given diminishing marginal
productivity of capital, Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989) have also reported that
human capital is quantitatively important relative to nonhuman capital as an
income or wealth measure.
In order to understand the problem of economic development as posed by
Lucas (1988), one has to look for ways to account for “... the observed pattern,
across countries and across time, in levels and rates of growth of per capita
income ...” in addition to pinning down the important factors that can generate
and sustain income growth.  Somehow, the literature has focused on disparities
in growth patterns across countries rather than across time, and it is on these
cross-country disparities that our paper will focus as well.  Trivially, one can
attribute the cross-sectional differences in growth experience to asymmetric
preferences and/or technology, but this is generally unacceptable as a scientific
explanation.  Less trivially, one may also attribute the observed diversities toUNDERSTANDING THE “PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT” 133
country-specific shocks and adjustments.  King and Rebelo (1993) have shown,
however, that these growth differences cannot be rationalized and sustained as
a long term phenomenon by short run (transitional) dynamics alone without
producing extremely counterfactual implications.2  Although the recent growth
literature has been successful in explaining cross-country differences in (per
capita) income levels in terms of different factor endowments, the explanation
of differences in (per capita) income growth rates is a much harder challenge.3
Assuming that countries have identical preferences and technology but
possibly different factor endowments, two major kinds of explanations have
been provided.  First, multiple steady states—economies with different initial
endowments can evolve along the same equilibrium growth path, but in different
directions, thus converging to different long-run positions;4 or multiple
equilibria—economies with the same initial endowment can follow different
equilibrium growth paths and converge to different long run positions.5  Second,
differences in national, especially tax, policies—which have differential effects
2Their analysis is conducted in exogenous growth models.  In principle, transitory changes
are capable of generating permanent effects in models of endogenous growth.  In other
words, in the context of endogenous growth models, one can attribute persistent differences
in income levels across countries to country-specific shocks.  But as a matter of philosophy,
it sounds odd to explain a regular pattern in terms of purely random factors.
3This is especially true in exogenous growth models, where the natural growth rate (being
determined by an exogenous rate of technological progress) is an unalterable given.
4See, e.g., Becker et al. (1990) and Azariadis and Drazen (1990).  Assuming that the private
rate of return on human capital rises with the stock of human capital, Becker et al. obtain
two stable steady states: one with large families and little human capital, and the other with
small families and perhaps growing human and physical capital.  They leave unanswered,
however, the question of what produces diversity in long run growth rates within the groups
of low-growth and high-growth countries separately.  Growth diversity to a more widespread
degree—in terms of the number of multiple stationary growth paths at various levels of
income—is obtained in Azariadis and Drazen through increasing social returns to scale with
local variations (what they called ‘threshold externalities’) in the accumulation of human
capital.
5See, for instance, Benhabib and Perli (1994), where they show that, depending on the
values of parameters (especially that of an externality parameter), there can exist a continuum
of equilibria—not just continuum of balanced growth paths—in the Lucas (1988) model.JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 134
on the private agents’ incentives to invest in growth-enhancing activities and
hence the rates of productivity growth in different countries.6  In this paper, we
shall focus on this second, i.e., policy, explanation.
Most of these policy-growth studies have been conducted in the context of
closed economies, where different countries are treated as isolated, non-
interacting entities.  With increasing global integration of the world economy,
factor mobility opens a room for international policy spillovers, with policy
changes in one country affecting resource allocation and growth in another
country through changes in factor price differentials.  In this paper, we would
like to examine whether the tax-driven diversity in income growth rates can be
preserved when (a) factors of production are freely mobile across national
borders, and (b) the factor incomes earned in the foreign country are potentially
subject to double taxation by both the home and foreign governments and are
thus affected by both domestic and foreign tax policies.  In particular, is factor
mobility a growth-equalizing force and international income taxation a growth-
diverging force?  How do factor mobility and cross-country tax structures interact
to determine growth differentials?
Similar issues have been addressed by Razin and Yuen (1996,1999).  But in
those two papers, we discuss only the role of capital mobility and international
capital taxation.  In this paper, we shall examine the role of labor mobility and
international labor taxation as well.  In particular, we shall try to distinguish
between the effects of capital mobility and labor mobility.  Although capital
flows seem to be more prevalent and face less restrictions globally than labor
flows, the latter is common among states within a federal system (such as the
contiguous provinces in Canada, prefectures in Japan, and states in the US)
and among neighboring countries with close economic and political ties (such
6See, e.g., Rebelo (1991) and Jones and Manuelli (1990) for a qualitative analysis, and
King and Rebelo (1990), Lucas (1990a), Stokey and Rebelo (1995), and Mendoza et al.
(1997) for a quantitative assessment, of the effects of tax changes on long run growth rates
in models with capital formation (human and physical) as the source of growth.  McGrattan
and Schmitz (1998) examine the role of a wide range of policy variables in explaining cross-
country income and growth differences.UNDERSTANDING THE “PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT” 135
as countries in the European Union).  Labor flows are thus more relevant for
regional growth.  Among other things, we would like to know whether labor
mobility and capital mobility are complements or substitutes as forces affecting
growth?  Are labor and capital flows symmetric in terms of their level and
growth effects on incomes per capita?
Given the close connection between population growth and economic growth
in the development process and as a broadening of the definition of the problem
of development, we shall try to account for the observed diversity in the growth
of (per capita and total) incomes as well as population.  When population growth
is determined exogenously, taxes can only affect income growth through the
growth engine (say, human capital), with indistinguishable effects on the growth
of per capita income and aggregate income.  Endogenizing population growth
will introduce a new channel through which taxes can affect per capita income
growth and aggregate income growth differently.   (See Appendix for more
details.)
For the above reasons, we think that it is important to examine the interaction
between taxation and (population and income) growth in the presence of factor
mobility.  To get some feel about the tax-growth relations across countries, we
display in Table 1 the average effective tax rates on capital and labor income
and the long run average annual growth rates of population and income across
the G-7 countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II derives a fundamental
relative growth condition and examines the growth-equalizing role of capital
mobility and labor mobility.  Section III provides an overview of two polar
principles of international income taxation.  The role of international factor
income taxation in explaining the diverse growth performance across countries
under different forms of factor mobility is analyzed in Section IV.  Section V
then examines a possible mechanism for income level convergence.  A summary
and some concluding remarks are contained in Section VI.  Most of the results
reported in this paper are model-free.  We present a full-fledged model of
endogenous growth (featuring both population and human capital growth) in a
closed economy context in the Appendix.  All the results in the paper can alsoJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 136
Table 1.  Tax Rates and Growth Rates in the G-7 Countries
Average tax rates Average annual growth rates
(1965-88)  (1965-87)
Capital Labor population per capita total
Country tax (%) tax (%) (%) GNP (%) GNP (%)
United States 43 25 1.00 1.5 2.50
United Kingdom 56 27 1.20 1.7 2.90
Germany 25 36 1.01 2.5 3.51
Italy 26 38 0.17 2.7 2.87
France 24 43 0.64 2.7 3.34
Japan 33 20 0.17 4.2 4.37
Canada 40 22 0.47 2.7 3.17
Sources:  Tax rate figures are drawn from Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), and growth
rate figures from the World Development Report (1989).
be derived more formally in an open economy extension of such model by
incorporating capital and labor mobility and global taxation.
II. Growth Rate Convergence: The Role of Factor Mobility
It is well understood from standard trade theory that perfect factor mobility
will lead to factor price equalization.  In particular, capital mobility will equalize
interest rates, whereas labor mobility will equalize wage rates, across countries.
To assess the role of factor mobility in equalizing cross-country differences in
output growth rates, we have to understand how factor price equalization is
related to growth rate equalization.  Their formal relation can be analyzed in a
full-fledged dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous growth such
as an open economy extension of the autarky model laid out in the Appendix.
Here in the main text, we shall focus only on those ingredients that are essential
for understanding the fundamental relative growth condition (*) spelled out
below.
Recall from the theory of saving that a consumer is allocating his
consumption over time in a utility-maximizing way when s/he is equating her/UNDERSTANDING THE “PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT” 137
his intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) to the interest rate ( after
adjusting for the relevant taxes), i.e.,
(1) IMRSt 1,t ¯ rt,
between any two periods t-1 and  t.  Here, we are assuming for simplicity full
depreciation of physical capital within one period and the absence of tax-
deductibility of depreciation allowances.  The reader can rest assured, though,
that the essence of all the results in the remainder of the paper does not
depend on this simplification; they will just be slightly complicated by the
presence of the depreciation terms if we drop this assumption.
Suppose consumer preferences are isoelastic with some altruistic element
as specified in the utility function below and as explained in fuller details in
the Appendix:
where Nt is the size of the population (or the size of the representative dynastic
family), ct the consumption of the representative consumer,  b the subjective
discount factor, x  the degree of interpersonal altruism, and s the inverse of
the elasticity of intertemporal consumption substitution.  In what follows,
we shall loosely interpret the parameter x  as reflecting consumer preference
towards ‘child quantity’ and 1- s as reflecting consumer preference towards
‘child quality’.  Then we can rewrite equation (1) as
(1)’
where the growth rate of any variable x between period t-1 and period t is
defined as gxt  = xt / xt-1 - 1.  [Cf. The fundamental growth equation in Rebelo
(1992).]  Between any two countries A and B with symmetric preferences
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(1)”
This  relative  growth  condition  (1)” will  hold  in  any  period  t > 0  (i.e.,
in  both  the  short  run  and  the  long  run).  In the long run when all
economic variables are growing at constant rates, (1)” can be simplified
further by imposing two balanced growth restrictions, viz., gi
c = gi
y (i = A,B)
and gA
Y = gB
Y .  The first restriction says that per capita consumption (c) and
per capita output (y) must grow at the same rate.  It follows from the long run
constancy of the consumption-output ratio.  The second restriction says that
aggregate output growth rates must be equal across countries.  It follows
from the requirement that the net trade balance (resulting from either capital
flows or labor flows) between any two countries grow at the same rate as
their respective GDPs along the global long run steady state growth path,
which is in turn a direct consequence of the long run constancy of the trade
balance-GDP ratio in all countries.  Since aggregate income (Y) is the product
of per capita income (y) and population  (N) so that gY  =  (1+gN ) (1+gy ) - 1,
this second restriction implies that  (1+gA
N ) (1+gB
N ) = (1+gB
y ) (1+gA
y ).7
























7Among other things, it implies that countries with lower population growth will enjoy faster
growth in their per capita incomes.  See Razin and Yuen (1997a) for supportive evidence on
this and other related empirical implications.  In a multi-country world, it is possible for
aggregate output growth to diverge across blocs of countries that are not interconnected by
factor mobility (i.e., when net capital and/or labor flows exist only among countries within
each bloc, but not across blocs).  But within each bloc (where factor mobility is effectively at
work), this total income growth equalization result will still apply  -and it is around this
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We shall exploit this condition to derive all the important results in the
rest of the paper.
A. The Role of Capital Mobility
Under perfect capital mobility, capital will flow from capital-rich or low-
MPK (marginal product of capital) countries to capital-poor or high-MPK
countries.  Given the law of diminishing returns, these cross-border capital
flows will ultimately equalize the MPKs or rates of return on capital in all
countries that are interconnected by capital mobility.8  In the absence of
taxes, therefore,  ¯ r
A ' ¯ r
B ¯ r
A ' ¯ r
B , which (from (*)) implies that gA
y  = gB
y.
Nonetheless, this growth rate convergence is only a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for convergence in per capita income levels.  For
countries that start off from different levels of initial income (due perhaps to
cross-country differences in initial endowments of human and/or physical
capital), their absolute income levels will still diverge (although their relative
income levels will remain constant) in spite of identical long run rates of
income growth.
B. The Role of Labor Mobility
As Razin and Sadka (1997) make clear in their survey paper, “... [w]ith
identical constant returns to scale technologies everywhere and two factors
(capital and labor), it suffices that one factor is freely mobile to equalize the
marginal product of each factor everywhere ...”  It follows that wage rate (or
marginal product of labor, MPH) equalization brought about by labor mobility
will also be accompanied by equalization of interest rates (or MPKs) whether
or not capital is internationally mobile. As a result, we again have
8Such rate-of-return equalization will be immediate if capital stocks (both existing and
new) can be moved from one country to another costlessly.  In a more realistic setting where
old capital is movable only at a high cost and/or where new capital investment involves
adjustment costs, the equalization will be slow and gradual.JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 140
¯ r
A ' ¯ r
B ¯ r
A ' ¯ r
B (in the absence of taxes), implying gA
y = gB
y from (*), i.e., growth
rate convergence.
In other words, under constant returns to scale technology, capital mobility
and labor mobility play a symmetric role in equalizing income growth rates
across countries without any necessary implications for income level
convergence.9  One may wonder why, as equation (*) suggests, interest rate
equalization implies equalization of per capita output growth rates.  To
understand this, one has to understand two basic relations.  First, the rate of
growth of per capita income (gy) is identical to the rate of growth of human
capital (gh), i.e., human capital is the engine of growth.  Second, the interest
rate (r, representing the rate of return on physical capital investment) has to
be equal to the rate of return on human capital investment (rh).  The first is a
balanced growth relation that holds in the long run under constant returns to
scale production technologies, and the second is a no-arbitrage relation
between the two kinds of capital investment.  Since the rate of return on
human capital (rh) governs how fast one would like to invest in her/his human
capital (i.e., gh), these two relations (gy = gh and r  = rh)  together imply a one-
to-one correspondence between interest rate equalization and growth rate
equalization.
So far, our analysis of growth rate convergence has abstracted from cross-
country diversity in income taxes that may give rise to factor price (interest
rate and/or wage rate) differentials even in the presence of factor mobility.
As we shall see, whether tax differences will drive a wedge in factor prices
will depend on the tax treatment of the foreign-source factor income earned
9Absent adjustment costs, factor price equalization, hence growth rate convergence, will
occur immediately following the open-up of the national borders for capital and/or labor
flows.  In addition to the normal case that involves positive net flows of capital and/or labor,
one may wonder whether two extreme cases will arise, i.e., (a) all capital or workers in the
world reside in one single country, and (b) no cross-border capital flows or labor flows take
place (i.e., back to autarky).  Theoretically, one can rule out case (a) by imposing the Inada
conditions and case (b) by assuming some fundamental cross-country heterogeneity (such
as differences in initial stocks of human and/or physical capital).  Empirically, these two
extreme cases can be dismissed as uninteresting and irrelevant.UNDERSTANDING THE “PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT” 141
by domestic factors of production -by both the domestic and foreign
governments.  In other words, it depends on the principle of international
income taxation adopted (or tax agreements reached) by their tax authorities.
It is to this particular issue that we now turn.
III. Principles of International Income Taxation
Two common principles of international income taxation are the residence
(or worldwide) principle and the source (or territorial) principle.  The
residence principle uses the place of residency of the taxpayer as the basis
for the assessment of tax liabilities.  The source principle employs the source
of income as the basis for assessing tax liabilities.10
Let us use t i
qD to denote the tax rate  on  the  domestic-source q-income
(q = w,r) of residents of country i, t i
qN the tax rate on the q-income earned by
non-residents in country i, and t i
qF  the tax rate on the foreign-source q-
income of country i residents on top of their non-residents’ taxes paid to the
foreign government net of the domestic tax credit or deduction granted by
country i  government. The  mnemonics  are  such that ‘D’ stands for domestic-
source, ‘F’ for foreign-source, and ‘N’ for non-residents.   All these three tax
rates are levied by the country i government.  The after-tax rate of return on
capital in country i,  ¯ r
i ¯ r
i, equals (1 -  ti
rD)ri  if capital is invested at home, and
[1 - t i
rF - (1 - a i
r )t  j
rN ]r j  if capital is invested abroad (in country j).   In the
general  case  where the credit rate, ai
r, lies between zero and one, we have
a partial  credit  system whereby part of the tax paid abroad is deducted
from the  tax  liability  in the home country.   It can be interpreted as a full
credit system when  ai
r = 1 and t  j
rN £  t i
rF   and  as  a  full  deduction  system
10For details, see Frenkel et al. (1991).JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 142
when ai
r = t i
rF .11  With international capital mobility between countries A




A similar set of arbitrage conditions across work locations holds for labor




Under the pure residence principle, residents are taxed on their worldwide
income uniformly regardless of their source of income, while non-residents
are not taxed at all. Under capital mobility,  this  implies that t  i
rD = t  i
rF and
t  i
rN = 0 (and ai
r becomes irrelevant).  From equations (2A) and (2B), it follows
that r A = r B, i.e., equalization of the pre-tax interest rates (or MPK’s), hence
efficiency in the global allocation of investment.  Similarly, the residence
principle implies equalization of pre-tax wage rates  -i.e., wA = wB- hence
efficiency in the global allocation of labor under labor mobility.
11Without any credit and deduction, the after-tax rate of return on capital invested abroad
(in country j) is (1-t  i
rF-t   j
rN )r j. Under the full credit system, whereby taxes paid abroad
are fully deducted from the tax liabilities in the home country, it becomes (1 - t  i
rF )r j.
The deduction system, whereby the tax paid abroad is deducted from taxable income in
the home country, provides an alternative relief from double taxation.   In that case, the
after-tax rate  of  return   on  capital  invested  abroad  (in  country j)  should  be  written
as  (1-t  i
rF) (1- t  j
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Under the pure source principle, all types of income originating in the
country  are  taxed  uniformly  regardless  of  the  place  of  residency  of
the income recipients.  With capital mobility,  we have, t i
rD = t i
rN  and either
t i
rF = ai
r = 0 or t  i
rF = a i
rt  j
rN.   From equations  (2A)  and  (2B),  this implies
(1 - t i
rD )r i = (1 - t  j
rD) r j  (i = A,B; j = B,A), i.e., equalization of the post-tax
interest rates (or IMRS’s), hence efficiency in the global allocation of
savings.  Similarly, the source principle implies equalization of post-tax wage
rates -(1 - t i
wD) wi = (1 - t  j
wD)w j (i = A,B; j B,A)-  hence efficiency in the
global allocation of household time under labor mobility.
IV. Interaction between Factor Mobility and International
Income Taxation
A. The Role of Capital Mobility and International Capital Income
Taxation
This is a case we have analyzed in an earlier paper (Razin and Yuen,
1996).  In order to facilitate the comparison with the case of labor mobility
and to build intuition behind the results derived below, let us revisit it here.
When capital is mobile, the choice of international tax principle and tax
rates levied on capital incomes earned by residents and non-residents at home
and abroad will affect the after-tax rates of return on capital (¯ r) (¯ r)  and, indirectly,
the long run rates of growth of per capita income (gy) across countries through
the fundamental growth condition (*).  Applied to two open economies A
and B, we have
(*)’
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residents (2B) to arrive at the last equality.  This equation shows how the
relative income growth rates in A and B depend on the capital tax rates in
the two countries and the relative bias in preference towards quantity versus
quality of children (x versus 1 - s).
Recall that, under perfect capital mobility, the no-arbitrage restrictions
will force the after-tax rates of return on capital (¯ r
)s) (¯ r
)s) to be equalized across
countries under the source principle.  Equation (*)’ therefore implies
convergence in income growth rates if the source principle prevails (i.e.,
when t A
rN = t A
rD and either t B
rF = aB
r = 0 or t B
rF = aB
r t A
rN ). Under the alternative
residence principle (i.e., when t B
rF = t B
rD ,t A
rN = 0 , and aB
r becomes irrelevant),
since the after-tax interest rates are not equalized by capital mobility,
asymmetry in ¯ r
)s ¯ r
)s (due to the asymmetry between t A
r  and t B
r) implies, in turn,
asymmetry in growth rates.
Equation (*)’ also indicates that under residence-based taxation, when
x  ¹  1- s, asymmetric tax rates may have differential effects on income growth.
In particular, when people are more biased towards quality rather than
quantity of children (x  < 1 - s), the country with a higher capital tax rate will
exhibit faster growth in per capita income.  Given that growth in aggregate
income will be equalized across countries in the long run, this implies slower
growth in population.  The reverse is true when people are more biased
towards quantity than quality (x  > 1 - s).12  The intuition is similar to that
given in the closed economy example in the Appendix.  Other things equal,
the country with a higher capital tax rate will have less incentive to invest in
physical capital and more to invest in either child quality if  x  < 1 - s or in
child quantity if x  > 1 - s.  We summarize these results in the following
proposition.
12The tax rate t r , rather than the after-tax MPK, matters here because the cross-country
MPKs will be equalized under the residence principle anyway.UNDERSTANDING THE “PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT” 145
Proposition  1  (P1):  International Capital Taxation and Relative
Growth13





if x ¹  1 - s irrespective of international tax differences;
(b)When both countries adopt the residence principle, two cases are possible:
i) if  x > 1 -  s , gy
A      gy
B and gN
A     gN
B  as t A
rD        tB
rD ; and
ii) if  x < 1 -  s , gy
A     gy
B and gN
A     gN
B  as t A
rD        tB
rD .
While asymmetry in tax rates can induce differential growth rates when
both countries adopt the residence principle, we note that the adoption of
asymmetric international tax principles (with or without asymmetry in tax
rates) by different countries can also generate disparity in growth rates.14
13In the special case where x  = 1 - s, the representative agent is ‘justly altruistic’, i.e., the
dynastic family can be viewed as one single person so that transferring consumption from
one family member to another will not change the utility of any family member.  In this
case, as they substitute out of physical capital investment following a rise in the capital
income tax, they will be indifferent between substituting into investment in child quality
and substituting into investment in child quantity.  As a result, we can show by using (*)’
that aggregate consumption growth will always be equalized across countries irrespective
of  cross-country  tax  differences under the source principle and may differ across





ct )  for  all  t > 0 under the source principle, and
(1+gA
Nt) (1+gA
ct)    (1+gB
Nt ) (1+gB
ct ) as  tA
rDt    tB
rDt for all t > 0 under the residence principle.
Notice that these results apply to the whole dynamic growth path (i.e., both the short run
and the long run).  To ensure the existence of balanced growth under source-based
taxation, however, we have to impose a restriction, i.e., t A
rD =  tB





c) in the long run.  This restriction is not required under residence-based
taxation, though.
14 When country A adopts the pure residence principle (with full deduction) and  country
B adopts  the  pure  source principle, for instance,  there are  again two cases to consider:
(i) gA
y
    gB
y and gA
N
    gB
N  as t A
rD    0 if  x > 1 - s; and (ii)  gA
y
     gB
y and gA
N
     gB
N  as
t A
rD     0 if  x  < 1 - s. In the special case where x =1 - s, we have (1 + gA




ct) as t A
rDt     0 for all t > 0.  But a restriction, t A
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Note also from equation (*)’ that, in cases intermediate between the pure
source and pure residence principles (i.e., with partial credit or deduction of
taxes on foreign-source capital income to be paid to the domestic and/or
foreign governments), the relative magnitudes of the tax wedges (1-  ti
rD) and
[1 - t j
rF - (1 - a j
r)  ti
rN] (i = A,B; j = B,A) matter.  In those cases, it will also be
important to distinguish between the differential growth effects of the two
alternative forms of relief from double taxation, i.e., the credit system and
the deduction system.
Proposition 1 characterizes the tax effects on relative growth due to
the international tax system and the relative bias in preference between
quantity and quality of children.  In reality, the residence principle is the
dominant tax principle widely adopted by most industrial countries for the
taxation of capital income.  The popularity of residence-based taxation may
be explained by its production efficiency, Ramsey (second best) efficiency,
and capital export neutrality implications.15  From (P1b), we can thus
conclude that international asymmetry in capital taxes is a plausible
explanation for the diversity in growth rates.  A closer examination of the
(implying   (1 + g A
N) (1 + g A
y) =  (1+gB
N) (1+gB
y)  in order to ensure the existence of
balanced growth  if  x = 1 - s.  In this scenario (irrespective of the relative magnitudes of
x and 1 - s), residents of country A will always earn a lower after-tax rate of return—by a
factor of (1-t A
rD)—than will  residents of country B irrespective of their locations of
investment  unless the capital tax rate in A is negative.  Residents of country A will earn
(1-t A
rD)rA  at  home and  (1-t A
rF) (1-t B
rN)rB abroad,   and residents of country  B will earn
(1-t B
rD)rB at home and rA abroad.  No arbitrage ensures that (1-t B
rD)rB = rA for  residents of
both countries.  That explains why, here, the sign of t A
rD rather than the relative size of t A
rD
and t B
rD  determines the relative growth rates of population and per capita consumption in
the two countries.  Although the details of the results here have to be modified if the residence
principle is applied by country A with full or partial credit or partial deduction instead, this
example serves to illustrate the somewhat weird possibility of growth rate convergence
even  when  countries  adopt  different  tax  principles  and different tax rates (say, when
t A
rD = 0 and t B
rD  > 0).
15See Frenkel et al. (1991) and Razin and Yuen (1999) for a discussion of these implications
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relation between capital taxes on the one hand and income and population
growth rates on the other seems to suggest that  x > 1 - s conforms to the
situation in these countries.  In other words, low capital tax rates tend to be
associated with faster growth in per capita income and slower growth in
population.  [See Razin and Yuen (1996).]
B. The Role of Labor Mobility and International Labor Income Taxation
Under  perfect labor mobility, the absence of arbitrage opportunities
ensures  the equalization  of  after-tax  wage  rates  for any  worker  who  can
choose  to work in either country.  In particular, the two wage arbitrage
conditions   (3A)   and  (3B)  hold,  i.e.,  (1-t i
wD)wi = [1 - t i
wF - (1 - ai
w)t j
wN]wj
(i = A,B; j = B,A).  To determine whether international income growth rates
will be equalized by labor mobility, we have to first figure out what these
two conditions imply about interest rate equalization and then use the
fundamental relative growth condition (*) to derive their implications for
growth rate convergence.
In perfectly competitive markets, profit-maximizing firms will always hire
capital and labor by equating their prices to their respective marginal products.
In other words, ri = MPKi and wi = MPHi.  To determine a more precise
relation between MPKi and MPHi, let us suppose (as in the closed economy
example in the Appendix) that the aggregate production function takes the
Cobb-Douglas form, i.e.,
where Y is aggregate output, K the aggregate capital stock, H total effective
labor, A (>0) the production coefficient, and  e e e e e Î  (0,1) the output share of
capital.  Suppose further that all countries face the same technology, i.e.,
identical production parameters (A, e e e e e).  Then one can easily show that the
relative capital-labor ratios, (K i/H i)/(K j/H j), can be expressed as either
YA K
, H
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(MPK  j /MPK  i)1/(1-e) or (MPH i/MPH j)1/e, i.e., (r j/r i) 1/(1-e) = (w i/w j)1/e.
Combined with the wage arbitrage condition (3A) and applied to any two
economies A and B, this implies that
Substituting this into the fundamental relative growth condition (*), we obtain
(*)”
Note  that  t A
wD  = t A
wF,  t B
wN = 0,  and aA
w  becomes  irrelevant  (implying
LAB = 1)   under   the   residence   principle,   and   tB
wN  =  t B








wN  (implying LAB    1 as t A
w    tB
w
  under the source
principle.  The proposition below should be transparent.
Proposition 2 (P2): International Labor Taxation and Relative
Growth 16
(a)When both countries adopt the source principle, two cases are possible:
i) if  x > 1- s , gA
y    gB
y   and gA
N    gB
N as W A         WB ; and
ii) if  x < 1- s , gA
y    gB
y   and gA
N    gB
N as W A         WB






















































16 We require W A = W B in case (a) and t A
rD = t B
rD in case (b), so (1+gA
N)(1+gA
y) =  (1+gB
N)(1+gB
y),
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(b)When both countries adopt the residence principle, two cases are possible:
i) if  x > 1- s , gA
y     gB
y  and gA
N     gB
N  as t A
rD  
       tB
rD ; and
ii) if  x < 1- s , gA
y     gB
y  and gA
N    gB
N as t A
rD  
       tB
rD  .
Contrary to what we find in the capital mobility case, (P2a) shows that
the source principle is not necessarily growth-equalizing.  Although the post-
tax MPH’s are equalized under territorial taxation, the post-tax MPK’s are
not unless the weighted tax wedges (W‘s) are uniform across countries.  So,
in contrast to (P2a), wage tax asymmetry matters here as much as interest
tax asymmetry.  Like (P1b), though, (P2b) implies that asymmetry in capital
tax rates under worldwide taxation can be a source of growth disparity.  As
before, we can show that asymmetry in the international income tax principle
(with or without asymmetry in tax rates) can be yet another source of growth
rate differences.17
C. The Role of Capital cum Labor Mobility and International Income
Taxation
What happens when both capital and labor can freely move across national
borders to take advantage of factor price differentials?  We understand from
the preceding analysis that, in equilibrium, capital mobility implies equal
after-tax interest rates from the perspectives of capital owners in each country,
irrespective of the location of their investment. Similarly, labor mobility













17 When country A adopts the residence principle and country B adopts the source principle,
gA
y    gB
y  and   gA
N    gB
N  as (1-t r
A)e    (1-t r
B)  if   x > 1 - s ,  whereas  gA
y    gB
y and gA
N    gB
N
as (1-t r
A)e    (1-t r
B)  if    x < 1 - s.   We  require  (1-t r
A)e = (1-t r
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irrespective of their work location. These two no-arbitrage conditions can
be expressed as
Together, they imply the following viability conditions
i = A,B; j = B, A.
Again, one can examine the possibility of growth rate convergence under
different international tax principles.  Instead of considering the various
possible cases one by one, we shall focus on a case of realistic interest, i.e.,
when the source principle is applied to labor income taxation and the
residence principle to capital income taxation.  Under source-based labor
taxation, t i
wD = t i
wN  and either t i
wF = ai
w = 0 or t i
wF = ai
wt j
wN.  Under residence-
based capital taxation, t i
rD = t i
rF and  t i
rN = 0 (ai
r  irrelevant).  Substituting
these conditions into the viability conditions above reduces them down to
one single restriction, viz., t A
w = t B
w, implying that LAB = 1.  Imposing this
restriction on the relative growth condition (*)” yields
(*)’’’
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Proposition 3 (P3): International Taxation and Relative Growth under
Capital cum Labor Mobility 18
When both countries adopt the residence principle for capital income
taxation and the source principle for labor income taxation, two cases are
possible:
i) if  x > 1- s , gA
y     gB
y  and gA
N     gB
N  as t A
rD  
       tB
rD ; and
ii) if  x < 1- s , gA
y     gB
y   and gA
N    gB
N as t A
rD  
       tB
rD .
Proposition 3 suggests that applying different international income tax
principles to different kinds of income can be another source of growth
diversity under free mobility of both factors of production only if the capital
income tax rates are also different across countries.  The results look very
similar to those stated in (P1b), i.e., capital taxation under the pure residence
principle. This is due to two reasons: (a) as we have seen in Section II, under
constant returns technology and in the absence of taxes, capital mobility and
labor mobility are perfect substitutes in terms of factor price equalization;
and (b) the viability conditions under capital cum labor mobility do not permit
wage tax asymmetry across countries, so that only interest tax asymmetry
matters here.
V. Income Level Convergence
So far, we have considered only growth rate convergence, which may or
may not be accompanied by convergence in income levels.  Obviously, the
various scenarios we have analyzed that may give rise to growth rate divergence
will also result in income level divergence.  Although the recent evidence on












18Again,  if x  = 1- s, we have to impose the restriction t A






y), in order to ensure the existence of balanced growth.
19 
See, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Ben-David (1995).JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 152
examine the conditions under which international diversity in income levels
can be eliminated.
Recall from Section II that, under a constant returns to scale technology,
capital mobility and labor mobility will play a symmetric role in equalizing
income growth rates across countries without any necessary implications for
income level convergence.  This conclusion is based on the implicit assumption
that physical capital and human capital are two symmetric factors of production.
However, it has been widely accepted that the ‘human nature’ involved in the
accumulation of human capital makes it quite different from the accumulation
of physical capital.  Among other things, one feature of human capital investment
that distinguishes it from physical capital investment is that it is a social activity
involving groups of people, that an individual’s effort to raise her/his knowledge
and skills may end up benefitting other members of the society through group
interactions.  In short, investment in human capital involves an external
productivity or spillover effect.  Lucas (1988,1990b) models these knowledge
spillovers in the form of a dependence of aggregate output on the economy-
wide average level of human capital (h) through an externality parameter (e) in
addition to its dependence on the capital and labor inputs  i.e., these externalities
generate some form of increasing returns.  The production function is modified
as follows:
This externality feature of human capital has been exploited by Lucas (1990b)
to resolve the puzzle why capital does not flow from rich to poor countries to
take advantage of rate-of-return benefits.  Assuming these spillover effects to
be somehow confined within national boundaries, we (Razin and Yuen, 1997b)
have also used it to show how, unlike capital mobility, labor mobility can serve
as an income-equalizing force by providing a channel for the transmission of
these external effects across countries/regions.
The idea behind our income level convergence result is simple and intuitive.
Under labor mobility, workers will move from low-wage (human-capital-poor)
YA K
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countries to high-wage (human-capital-rich) countries.  By mingling themselves
with more knowledgeable/skillful workers in the high-wage country, migrants
or guest workers will enjoy an upward shift in their wage profile.  Through
wage arbitrage, ‘those left behind’ in the low-wage country will also experience
higher wage profiles.  This will give them incentive to increase their rate of
human capital investment.  In this sense, we can view the migrant workers as
‘messengers’ of technological progress, transmitting the more advanced
knowhow from the foreign country to their home country.  Over time, this
transmission mechanism will lead to equalization in the levels of human capital
and income per capita among economies interlinked by labor mobility.
This level convergence result, which also implies growth rate convergence,
does not mean that cross-country differences in income tax rates can never give
rise to international diversity in income growth.  Since the result is a
manifestation of long run behavior, all it means is that balanced growth may
not exist in the presence of tax asymmetry when knowledge spillovers (or
increasing returns) are prevalent.  Evidently, when the economies fail to converge
to their steady state growth paths because of such tax asymmetry, their income
levels and growth rates will generally diverge as well.  Put differently, tax
harmonization is generally required for level convergence.
VI. Conclusion
Let us first summarize the answers to the several questions posed in the
introduction, and then make some concluding remarks.  First, factor (both capital
and labor) mobility is found to be a driving force that will equalize aggregate
income growth rates, but not necessarily per capita income growth rates, in the
long run.  The latter differences may persist due to, say, cross-country differences
in income tax rates.  Second, capital mobility and labor mobility are perfect
substitutes as growth-equalizing forces in the absence of international tax
differences and of knowledge spillovers (or increasing returns).  Third, tax-
driven diversity in growth rates can be preserved under (i) the residence principle
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mobile; or (iii) when different countries adopt different international tax
principles; or (iv) when different international tax principles are applied to capital
incomes and labor incomes separately.  [See Propositions 1-3.]  Fourth,  the
relative growth effects of taxes between capital mobility and labor mobility are
symmetric under the residence principle, but not also under the source principle
[cf. Propositions 1 and 2] or when different countries follow different
international tax principles [cf. footnotes 14 and 17].   Finally, income level
convergence can be brought about by international transmission of technology
through labor mobility in the presence of knowledge spillovers.
In sum, we have identified two major sources of disparity in income (and
population) growth rates across countries.  They are: (i) asymmetry in factor
income tax rates, and (ii) asymmetry in international income tax principles, as
adopted by different countries or applied to different factors of production.  We
have also shown how the growth effects of capital mobility and labor mobility
can differ under these cases and how they are related to the relative bias in
preferences towards quantity and quality of children.  Although these differences
can easily be eliminated if enough symmetry is assumed between the two factor
inputs (e.g., uniform taxation of incomes from both factors), we believe that
the asymmetries examined here are very real.  In fact, the unequal barriers to
the cross-border movements of the two factors can be another real source of
asymmetry that is nonetheless ignored in our analysis.
The purpose of our paper has been to point out some relevant theoretical
possibilities as solutions to the problem of economic development.  We are not
trying to claim that the sources of growth diversity and of asymmetry in the
mobility of labor and capital we have analyzed here are necessarily the crux of
the problem.  They may be.  But the answer has to be found from the data.  In
Razin and Yuen (1997a), we provide some evidence in support of the growth-
equalizing effect of capital mobility and of the income-equalizing effect of
labor mobility.  In particular, our empirical results show that restrictions on
labor flows tend to make per capita incomes more divergent across nations
and/or regions.
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changes in a country can be a result of both births/deaths and inflow/outflow of
people, it is interesting to examine the link among fertility, migration, human
capital formation, and income growth.  Attention has to be drawn to the
distinction between labor migration and labor mobility.  (Here in this paper, we
have been sloppy in using the two terms interchangeably as if they meant the
same thing.)  While the latter involves supplying effective labor to work in
another country, the former also involves relocating one’s home and changing
one’s national identity, hence the environment in which one raises children and
invests in human capital.  Cross-country wage rates will be equalized under
labor mobility, but not necessarily under labor migration.  What will be equalized
instead under free migration are the lifetime utilities of the marginal migrant in
the home and foreign countries.  Consequently, it is not immediately obvious
whether labor migration is a growth-equalizing force.  Migration will also change
the context in which questions of policy choice and national welfare should be
addressed.
Throughout the paper, we have been concerned about possible explanations
of international diversity in income levels and growth rates.  As a mirror image
of the “problem of economic development”, one may sometimes want to know
under what conditions (however stringent) the diversity may vanish completely.
This is especially true for member countries of an economic union (such as
countries in the European Union and federal states in the US).  Our results
suggest two essential preconditions: (i) harmonization of income tax rates, and
(ii) labor mobility to facilitate knowledge spillovers.  Condition (i) will ensure
growth rate convergence irrespective of the international tax principle.20
Condition (ii) will ensure income level convergence as well.  These findings
may not be surprising at all.  We do hear them widely advocated by the EU.21
20 One can conceive of some special cases under which a combination of asymmetric
international tax principles and asymmetric income tax rates may produce symmetric growth
rates.  (See, e.g., the discussion in footnote 14.)  But these are too special to be of general
interest for our purpose.
21 What is perhaps more surprising is that, in the presence of perfect labor mobility, capital
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The question is whether each national government will willingly choose to
follow these guidelines.
In Razin and Yuen (1999), we show that, under capital mobility and with or
without international tax coordination, it is optimal (both national-welfare-
maximizing and global-welfare-maximizing) for each national government to
eliminate taxes on capital incomes from all sources in the long run.  Based on
results obtained by Jones et al. (1997) for the optimal wage tax in a closed
economy, we conjecture that the same will apply to labor income taxes under
labor mobility in the absence of human capital externalities.  In other words,
optimal tax policies are growth-equalizing.  But in these cases (absent knowledge
spillovers), level convergence cannot be guaranteed.
In the presence of knowledge spillovers, however, the optimal structure of
taxes on labor income will change.  In particular, two kinds of inefficiencies
associated with people’s migration decisions and human capital investment
decisions  will arise.  In terms of migration decisions, the importation of human-
capital-poor workers from the low-wage country into the human-capital-rich
(high-wage) country will impose a negative externality on the latter’s workers
by lowering their average level of human capital and consequently their wage
profile.  In the absence of immigration restrictions, the migrant workers will
not take this negative external effect into account and thus over-migrate to the
host country.  In terms of education decisions, people in both the labor-importing
and labor-exporting countries will under-invest in human capital.  This is because
each worker, being small, will ignore the positive external effect its human
capital investment has in raising the average level of human capital in her/his
workplace.
In Razin and Yuen (1997b), we show that inefficiency of the first kind can
be corrected through a (non-resident) wage tax on imported workers plus a
wage subsidy to domestic workers in the labor-importing country while
inefficiency of the second kind can be eradicated through education subsidies
in both the labor-importing and labor-exporting countries.  In the non-
cooperative equilibrium, the host country government will use the wage tax-
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and preventing the achievement of income equality.  At the same time, the
source-country government (who ignores the potential benefits of exporting
more educated workers to the host country) will under-subsidize education,
thus resulting in inefficiently low levels of income in both countries.  In order
to achieve income equality while internalizing the cross-country spillovers of
human capital externalities, concerted efforts to lift barriers to labor mobility,
to harmonize income tax rates, and to coordinate education (or human capital
investment) policies are necessary.  In other words, another plausible ‘solution’
to the “problem of economic development” lies in the lack of international
policy cooperation.  This speculative answer is again subject to empirical
verification.JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 158
APPENDIX
Population Growth and Income Growth: A Closed Economy
Example
Among the development patterns summarized by Romer (1989), the negative
correlation between population growth rates and the levels of per capita income
is classified as one stylised fact.  Similar correlation that exists between
population growth (gN) and per capita income growth (gy) is not as clear.22  In
fact, both of these correlations vary across development stages and tend to be
negative during the more advanced stage of development.23
To understand the rationale behind the relation between population growth
and income growth, let us consider a simple example that features their tradeoff
as an equilibrium outcome in a closed economy.  Imagine a dynastic family
with Nt identical members in each period (t = 0,1,2,...) and two engines of
growth (human capital and population).  The typical agent cares about his own













22 The dynamic evolution of this cross-sectional correlation is a question of demographic
transition—a transition from high rates of fertility and mortality to relatively low rates
during the development process—and thus varies with the phase of development of the
various countries.  See Ehrlich and Lui (1991) for a theory of demographic transition linking
longevity, fertility, and economic growth.
23 Since countries that exhibit low rates of growth of income will turn out to have low levels
of income over time, these two types of correlation may not be all that distinguishable.  They
are, however, quite different from the more familiar negative relation between fertility and
the level of income.  The latter is explained by Becker and Lewis (1963) in terms of the
tradeoff between the ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ of children, where the rise in income raises the
amount parents invest in their children, making each and every child a more ‘expensive
commodity’ and thus causing a decline in the number of children.
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where b  is the subjective discount factor, x  an altruism parameter, and s  the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption.  As long
as x > 0, altruism is reflected not only in preference for ‘quantity’ but also
‘quality’ of children (viz., consumption per capita, or standard of living)—
since, with positive  x, there is weight given to quantity, but the weight on the
consumption term is magnified as well.  Observe that if  x > 1 - s, then there
will be a relative bias in preference towards quantity; whereas if  x < 1 - s, the
bias will be in the opposite direction.24  When x  = 1- s, the representative
agent is said to be ‘fairly altruistic’ in the sense that he cares only about the size
of the total pie (Nt ct) to be shared among all family members, but is indifferent
to the exact sharing arrangement.
In each period t, there are Nt members in the representative family (given
N0 at t = 0).  Each household member is endowed with one unit of time (net of
the leisure and working time, assumed to be perfectly inelastic)25 and possesses
ht of human capital and kt of physical capital carried over from period t - 1
(given h0 and k0 at t=0) in each period t.  S/he can split the unit time among
learning in schools (et for education) and child-rearing (vt for vitality).  S/he
also has to decide how much capital (kt+1) to be carried forward to the ensuing
period.  Newly acquired effective labor (Nt ht) and physical capital (Nt kt) are
supplied to the labor and capital markets in each period t at the prevailing
competitive wage (wt) and rental (rt) rates.
The dynamics of the two growth engines are determined as follows.  The
child-rearing activity gives rise to population growth:
24 In terms of the utilitarian approach, the objective function (1) is a Millian (average utility)
social welfare criterion when x   = 0.  When x   = 1, it becomes a Benthamite (sum of utilities)
criterion.  See Razin and Yuen (1995) for details.
25 Making leisure and worked hours endogenous will make the analysis less tractable.  The
allocation of time to work at home or abroad is allowed to change in the labor mobility
framework considered in the text.  We note here, though, that time allocation may vary over
the stage of development in the economy.  In poor countries, people may be more concerned
about splitting time between work and child-rearing.  In richer countries, the concern may be
more about education vis-à-vis work and/or leisure.JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 160
(A2)
where D > 0 and   a Î   (0,1] are the fertility efficiency coefficient and productivity
parameter respectively.  One can think of Nt+1 / Nt as one plus the number of
children per family (when the number of parents is normalized to unity).  Since
the child-rearing cost (v) is increasing with the number of children, Dva  can be
thought of as the inverse function of this cost-quantity relation.  The schooling
activity contributes to human capital growth:
(A3)
where B > 0 is the knowledge efficiency coefficient and  g  Î (0,1] the productivity
parameter.
Final  output (Yt) is produced by competitive firms using physical capital
(Kt = Nt kt)  and total effective labor (Ht = Nt ht) via a Cobb-Douglas-type
technology:  Yt = A K e
 H1-e, where  A > 0  is  the  production  coefficient   and
e e e e e Î  (0,1) the output share of capital.  Goods produced are either consumed by
the private sector (Nt ct) and by the government (Gt) or invested in the form of
physical capital (Kt+1).  The societal resource constraint can thus be written as:
(A4)
For simplicity, full depreciation is assumed for Kt, Nt, and ht in each period.
The fiscal authority levies flat rate taxes on labor income (t wt) and capital
income (t rt) to finance its spending (Gt), which is assumed to be a fraction (t t)
of national output.  Absent deficit finance, the fiscal budget is balanced in
every period, with  tt = e   trt + (1-e)  twt.  Below, we shall use W, W w, and W r to
denote the tax wedges 1 - t, 1 - t w , and 1 - t r respectively.
Since, in a representative family, every member will receive equal treatment
and the economy at large is closed to external loans, borrowing and lending at
the individual level will be superfluous.  Thus, the (effective) family budget
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facing the dynastic head is to choose {ct , et , Kt+1, Nt+1, ht+1}t=0  to maximize
(A1) subject to (A2), (A3), and the budget constraint, given {wt, rt, W wt, W rt}t=0.
The firm’s problem is to choose the amount of capital (Kd
t) and effective labor
(Hd
t) in each period t to maximize profit Yt  - wt Hd
t - rt Kd
t, given wt and rt .  The
equilibrium wage rates (wt) and interest rates (rt) are determined in the labor
and capital markets under market clearing: Nt ht  =  Hd
t and Kt = Kd
t  .
The set of first order conditions describing the optimizing behavior of the
household and the firm and the market clearing conditions are as follows.  The




  mt = bmt+1 wrt+1 rt+1, (C3)
(C4)
(C)
The Lagrange multipliers (µ for “mu”ltipliers) at time t associated with the
consumer budget constraint and the laws of motion of population and human
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(F2)
The equilibrium conditions in the labor and capital markets (E) are
(E1)
(E2)
Substituting (A2), (A3) and (F1) into (C2), we get,
(A5)
Along the balanced growth path, time allocations and tax rates are constant,
i.e., et = et+1, W t =  W t  +1, W wt = W wt+1, and W rt = W rt+1,so that (A5) implies that
(A6)
where the two terms in (A6) are given respectively by
(A7)
from (A2), (C4), and (F1), and
(A8)
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We shall restrict our attention here to the growth effects of taxes along the
balanced growth path—the special path along which the time allocations as
well as the rates of growth of population, human capital, physical capital, and
output are all constant.  Along this path, by combining (A5)—(A8), we can
reduce the system of steady state equations to the following single equation in
one single unknown, the time allocation (e).
The   growth   rates   can   be  expressed   in  terms  of  e  as: gh  = Beg - 1  and
gN = D (1-e)a - 1, with gc = gy = gh and gK = gY, where Y denotes total income
and y per capita income (i.e., Y/N).  Since e+v = 1, the competing use of time
for the two growth activities implies a negative relation between gy and gN as
found in the data.  Note the dependence of the time allocations and the growth
rates on the preference of the agent towards child quantity relative to quality
(reflected by  x/(1 - s)) and the effectiveness of time in producing quality relative
to quantity (reflected by g/a).  Assuming identical preferences (b ,  x, s ) and
technology (a ,   g ,   e , B,D), then growth rates can differ across isolated economies
only if their governments adopt different fiscal policies (t, t w, t r ).
To examine the growth effects of tax changes, two simple policy experiments
can be considered.  (i) Change in income taxes under uniform taxation of labor
and capital incomes with compensating change in the output share of the
government (i.e., t, t w, t r ); and (ii) change in the capital income tax rate (t r )
compensated by a change in the labor income tax (t w ), keeping  t constant.
Comparative  statics show that e,  hence gh , is decreasing (increasing) in t r as
x  > (<) 1 - s  under the first experiment, and the reverse is true under the
second experiment.  One can relate these effects to the tradeoff between the
quantity and quality of children a la Becker and Lewis (1973).  Other things
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encourage investment in child quantity if people are more altruistic (x  > 1 - s)
or investment in child quality if they are less so (x  < 1 - s).  As  t w increases,
however, investment in both child quality and child quantity will be discouraged
since the returns on both types of investment depend on the future stream of
after-tax wage income.  But the returns from investment in quantity depend
also on the utility gain net of the cost of raising an additional child, which will
be     0 as   x   1- s.26  ‘Quantity’ investment will thus become more (less)
favorable as x  > (<) 1- s  as a result of the tax increase.  Piecing these arguments
together confirms the result under experiment (i) when the increase in t r is
accompanied by an equal increase in t w.  But if the increase in t r is accompanied
by a reduction in t w, the argument for t w above will have to be reversed, with





26 The utility gain from ‘quality’ investment net of the gain from ‘quantity’ investment is
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